Bayes theorem, confusion between $P(X|Z)$ and $P(Z|X)$
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In a problem I'm trying to solve it states:
There is a machine displays the inserted credit. Unfortunately, the display is broken. At time $k = 3$, we can infer from the display that the inserted credit is either $2$ or $3$, but certainly not $0$ or $1$.
Without taking into account the additional information provided by the display, the state x(3) has the probability distribution
$f(x_3=0) = 0.1,$
$f(x_3=1) = 0.2,$
$f(x_3=2) = 0.2,$
$f(x_3=3) = 0.5.$
What is the probability distribution of $x(3)$ given the information from the display?
Now my reasoing was the following: the sentence we can infer from the display that the inserted credit is either $2$ or $3$, but certainly not $0$ or $1$ is equivalent to say: given the state of the display, we can say there is $50%$ probability that the coin is $2$ and $50%$ probability that the coin is $3$.
So the probability distribution asked would be simply $50%$ for $2$ and $50%$ for $3$.
But from the solution of the exercise, it looks at the problem from another perspective. It states that if we can infer something from the display means that we can depict the conditional probability of $z$ given $x$ (and not the opposite as I thought) and then uses the prior information $f(x_3)$ and this likelihood ($f(z|x_3)$) with the bayes theorem to arrive to the solution.
Why is my reasoning wrong?
bayes-theorem
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0
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In a problem I'm trying to solve it states:
There is a machine displays the inserted credit. Unfortunately, the display is broken. At time $k = 3$, we can infer from the display that the inserted credit is either $2$ or $3$, but certainly not $0$ or $1$.
Without taking into account the additional information provided by the display, the state x(3) has the probability distribution
$f(x_3=0) = 0.1,$
$f(x_3=1) = 0.2,$
$f(x_3=2) = 0.2,$
$f(x_3=3) = 0.5.$
What is the probability distribution of $x(3)$ given the information from the display?
Now my reasoing was the following: the sentence we can infer from the display that the inserted credit is either $2$ or $3$, but certainly not $0$ or $1$ is equivalent to say: given the state of the display, we can say there is $50%$ probability that the coin is $2$ and $50%$ probability that the coin is $3$.
So the probability distribution asked would be simply $50%$ for $2$ and $50%$ for $3$.
But from the solution of the exercise, it looks at the problem from another perspective. It states that if we can infer something from the display means that we can depict the conditional probability of $z$ given $x$ (and not the opposite as I thought) and then uses the prior information $f(x_3)$ and this likelihood ($f(z|x_3)$) with the bayes theorem to arrive to the solution.
Why is my reasoning wrong?
bayes-theorem
Since you haven't really given any reason, it's hard to say where it's wrong. You'd need to explain how you arrived at the erroneous belief that "we can infer from the display that the inserted credit is either $2$ or $3$" is equivalent to "there is a $50%$ probability that the credit is $2$ and a $50%$ probability that the credit is $3$". My guess would be that you probably did so by an erroneous application of the principle of indifference, but so far, that's just a guess.
â joriki
Aug 30 at 6:56
Well my reasoning is the following: the display itself has an own probability distribution. At time k=3 we are sure about it state, because we can read it on the screen. Because it's broken we can't really tell if what it's written it's true, but because we can infer that the inserted credit is either 2 or 3 we can say that given the state of the display the will be 2 or 3 coin with equal probability, because we don't have any further information
â Tommaso Bendinelli
Aug 30 at 7:03
add a comment |Â
up vote
0
down vote
favorite
up vote
0
down vote
favorite
In a problem I'm trying to solve it states:
There is a machine displays the inserted credit. Unfortunately, the display is broken. At time $k = 3$, we can infer from the display that the inserted credit is either $2$ or $3$, but certainly not $0$ or $1$.
Without taking into account the additional information provided by the display, the state x(3) has the probability distribution
$f(x_3=0) = 0.1,$
$f(x_3=1) = 0.2,$
$f(x_3=2) = 0.2,$
$f(x_3=3) = 0.5.$
What is the probability distribution of $x(3)$ given the information from the display?
Now my reasoing was the following: the sentence we can infer from the display that the inserted credit is either $2$ or $3$, but certainly not $0$ or $1$ is equivalent to say: given the state of the display, we can say there is $50%$ probability that the coin is $2$ and $50%$ probability that the coin is $3$.
So the probability distribution asked would be simply $50%$ for $2$ and $50%$ for $3$.
But from the solution of the exercise, it looks at the problem from another perspective. It states that if we can infer something from the display means that we can depict the conditional probability of $z$ given $x$ (and not the opposite as I thought) and then uses the prior information $f(x_3)$ and this likelihood ($f(z|x_3)$) with the bayes theorem to arrive to the solution.
Why is my reasoning wrong?
bayes-theorem
In a problem I'm trying to solve it states:
There is a machine displays the inserted credit. Unfortunately, the display is broken. At time $k = 3$, we can infer from the display that the inserted credit is either $2$ or $3$, but certainly not $0$ or $1$.
Without taking into account the additional information provided by the display, the state x(3) has the probability distribution
$f(x_3=0) = 0.1,$
$f(x_3=1) = 0.2,$
$f(x_3=2) = 0.2,$
$f(x_3=3) = 0.5.$
What is the probability distribution of $x(3)$ given the information from the display?
Now my reasoing was the following: the sentence we can infer from the display that the inserted credit is either $2$ or $3$, but certainly not $0$ or $1$ is equivalent to say: given the state of the display, we can say there is $50%$ probability that the coin is $2$ and $50%$ probability that the coin is $3$.
So the probability distribution asked would be simply $50%$ for $2$ and $50%$ for $3$.
But from the solution of the exercise, it looks at the problem from another perspective. It states that if we can infer something from the display means that we can depict the conditional probability of $z$ given $x$ (and not the opposite as I thought) and then uses the prior information $f(x_3)$ and this likelihood ($f(z|x_3)$) with the bayes theorem to arrive to the solution.
Why is my reasoning wrong?
bayes-theorem
bayes-theorem
edited Aug 30 at 8:57
Kenta S
1,1741418
1,1741418
asked Aug 30 at 6:46
Tommaso Bendinelli
456
456
Since you haven't really given any reason, it's hard to say where it's wrong. You'd need to explain how you arrived at the erroneous belief that "we can infer from the display that the inserted credit is either $2$ or $3$" is equivalent to "there is a $50%$ probability that the credit is $2$ and a $50%$ probability that the credit is $3$". My guess would be that you probably did so by an erroneous application of the principle of indifference, but so far, that's just a guess.
â joriki
Aug 30 at 6:56
Well my reasoning is the following: the display itself has an own probability distribution. At time k=3 we are sure about it state, because we can read it on the screen. Because it's broken we can't really tell if what it's written it's true, but because we can infer that the inserted credit is either 2 or 3 we can say that given the state of the display the will be 2 or 3 coin with equal probability, because we don't have any further information
â Tommaso Bendinelli
Aug 30 at 7:03
add a comment |Â
Since you haven't really given any reason, it's hard to say where it's wrong. You'd need to explain how you arrived at the erroneous belief that "we can infer from the display that the inserted credit is either $2$ or $3$" is equivalent to "there is a $50%$ probability that the credit is $2$ and a $50%$ probability that the credit is $3$". My guess would be that you probably did so by an erroneous application of the principle of indifference, but so far, that's just a guess.
â joriki
Aug 30 at 6:56
Well my reasoning is the following: the display itself has an own probability distribution. At time k=3 we are sure about it state, because we can read it on the screen. Because it's broken we can't really tell if what it's written it's true, but because we can infer that the inserted credit is either 2 or 3 we can say that given the state of the display the will be 2 or 3 coin with equal probability, because we don't have any further information
â Tommaso Bendinelli
Aug 30 at 7:03
Since you haven't really given any reason, it's hard to say where it's wrong. You'd need to explain how you arrived at the erroneous belief that "we can infer from the display that the inserted credit is either $2$ or $3$" is equivalent to "there is a $50%$ probability that the credit is $2$ and a $50%$ probability that the credit is $3$". My guess would be that you probably did so by an erroneous application of the principle of indifference, but so far, that's just a guess.
â joriki
Aug 30 at 6:56
Since you haven't really given any reason, it's hard to say where it's wrong. You'd need to explain how you arrived at the erroneous belief that "we can infer from the display that the inserted credit is either $2$ or $3$" is equivalent to "there is a $50%$ probability that the credit is $2$ and a $50%$ probability that the credit is $3$". My guess would be that you probably did so by an erroneous application of the principle of indifference, but so far, that's just a guess.
â joriki
Aug 30 at 6:56
Well my reasoning is the following: the display itself has an own probability distribution. At time k=3 we are sure about it state, because we can read it on the screen. Because it's broken we can't really tell if what it's written it's true, but because we can infer that the inserted credit is either 2 or 3 we can say that given the state of the display the will be 2 or 3 coin with equal probability, because we don't have any further information
â Tommaso Bendinelli
Aug 30 at 7:03
Well my reasoning is the following: the display itself has an own probability distribution. At time k=3 we are sure about it state, because we can read it on the screen. Because it's broken we can't really tell if what it's written it's true, but because we can infer that the inserted credit is either 2 or 3 we can say that given the state of the display the will be 2 or 3 coin with equal probability, because we don't have any further information
â Tommaso Bendinelli
Aug 30 at 7:03
add a comment |Â
2 Answers
2
active
oldest
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up vote
1
down vote
accepted
You're applying the principle of indifference where it doesn't apply. There are two requirements for that principle to apply. First, there must be symmetry among the alternatives (or, as the Wikipedia article puts it, they must be âindistinguishable except for their namesâ). This is not the case here â the credit states $2$ and $3$ are distinguishable, as you can readily convince yourself by replacing $3$ with $1000$: You probably wouldn't believe that the credit states $2$ and $1000$ are equiprobable. The second requirement is the one you state, that we don't have further information. In the present case, we do have further information, namely, the given a priori distribution, which again distinguishes between the credit states $2$ and $3$. Thus the principle of indifference doesn't apply.
1
That's make completely sense! Thank You!
â Tommaso Bendinelli
Aug 30 at 13:29
add a comment |Â
up vote
-1
down vote
OK this is an interesting problem. So we know that inserted credit equals $2$ or $3$. Let us try to calculate the probability that the inserted credit is $3$ given that we know it is $2$ or $3$. I will just call the inserted credit $x$. We use the formula $P(A|B)=P(A wedge B)/P(B)$. Where $A$ is $x=3$ and $B$ is $x=2 vee x=3$. This becomes $P(x=3 | (x=2 vee x=3))$. The fact that $A$ implies $B$ and so $P(A wedge B)=P(A)$ is important to keep in mind. We can calculate this as $0.5/0.7=0.71$. By a similar method, we can work out that the probability that the display read $2$ is $0.2/0.7=0.29$. These add up to $1$ which is good news. It must be one of them! Another way to have come at this would have been to say the answer must be $2$ or $3$ so the probabilities of these scores must split in the ration $0.2:0.5$ or $2:5$ or $0.29:0.71$.
The OP states that a solution of this kind is already available; the question asked not to provide such a solution but to explain why the alternative solution is wrong.
â joriki
Aug 30 at 8:17
add a comment |Â
2 Answers
2
active
oldest
votes
2 Answers
2
active
oldest
votes
active
oldest
votes
active
oldest
votes
up vote
1
down vote
accepted
You're applying the principle of indifference where it doesn't apply. There are two requirements for that principle to apply. First, there must be symmetry among the alternatives (or, as the Wikipedia article puts it, they must be âindistinguishable except for their namesâ). This is not the case here â the credit states $2$ and $3$ are distinguishable, as you can readily convince yourself by replacing $3$ with $1000$: You probably wouldn't believe that the credit states $2$ and $1000$ are equiprobable. The second requirement is the one you state, that we don't have further information. In the present case, we do have further information, namely, the given a priori distribution, which again distinguishes between the credit states $2$ and $3$. Thus the principle of indifference doesn't apply.
1
That's make completely sense! Thank You!
â Tommaso Bendinelli
Aug 30 at 13:29
add a comment |Â
up vote
1
down vote
accepted
You're applying the principle of indifference where it doesn't apply. There are two requirements for that principle to apply. First, there must be symmetry among the alternatives (or, as the Wikipedia article puts it, they must be âindistinguishable except for their namesâ). This is not the case here â the credit states $2$ and $3$ are distinguishable, as you can readily convince yourself by replacing $3$ with $1000$: You probably wouldn't believe that the credit states $2$ and $1000$ are equiprobable. The second requirement is the one you state, that we don't have further information. In the present case, we do have further information, namely, the given a priori distribution, which again distinguishes between the credit states $2$ and $3$. Thus the principle of indifference doesn't apply.
1
That's make completely sense! Thank You!
â Tommaso Bendinelli
Aug 30 at 13:29
add a comment |Â
up vote
1
down vote
accepted
up vote
1
down vote
accepted
You're applying the principle of indifference where it doesn't apply. There are two requirements for that principle to apply. First, there must be symmetry among the alternatives (or, as the Wikipedia article puts it, they must be âindistinguishable except for their namesâ). This is not the case here â the credit states $2$ and $3$ are distinguishable, as you can readily convince yourself by replacing $3$ with $1000$: You probably wouldn't believe that the credit states $2$ and $1000$ are equiprobable. The second requirement is the one you state, that we don't have further information. In the present case, we do have further information, namely, the given a priori distribution, which again distinguishes between the credit states $2$ and $3$. Thus the principle of indifference doesn't apply.
You're applying the principle of indifference where it doesn't apply. There are two requirements for that principle to apply. First, there must be symmetry among the alternatives (or, as the Wikipedia article puts it, they must be âindistinguishable except for their namesâ). This is not the case here â the credit states $2$ and $3$ are distinguishable, as you can readily convince yourself by replacing $3$ with $1000$: You probably wouldn't believe that the credit states $2$ and $1000$ are equiprobable. The second requirement is the one you state, that we don't have further information. In the present case, we do have further information, namely, the given a priori distribution, which again distinguishes between the credit states $2$ and $3$. Thus the principle of indifference doesn't apply.
answered Aug 30 at 7:09
joriki
167k10180333
167k10180333
1
That's make completely sense! Thank You!
â Tommaso Bendinelli
Aug 30 at 13:29
add a comment |Â
1
That's make completely sense! Thank You!
â Tommaso Bendinelli
Aug 30 at 13:29
1
1
That's make completely sense! Thank You!
â Tommaso Bendinelli
Aug 30 at 13:29
That's make completely sense! Thank You!
â Tommaso Bendinelli
Aug 30 at 13:29
add a comment |Â
up vote
-1
down vote
OK this is an interesting problem. So we know that inserted credit equals $2$ or $3$. Let us try to calculate the probability that the inserted credit is $3$ given that we know it is $2$ or $3$. I will just call the inserted credit $x$. We use the formula $P(A|B)=P(A wedge B)/P(B)$. Where $A$ is $x=3$ and $B$ is $x=2 vee x=3$. This becomes $P(x=3 | (x=2 vee x=3))$. The fact that $A$ implies $B$ and so $P(A wedge B)=P(A)$ is important to keep in mind. We can calculate this as $0.5/0.7=0.71$. By a similar method, we can work out that the probability that the display read $2$ is $0.2/0.7=0.29$. These add up to $1$ which is good news. It must be one of them! Another way to have come at this would have been to say the answer must be $2$ or $3$ so the probabilities of these scores must split in the ration $0.2:0.5$ or $2:5$ or $0.29:0.71$.
The OP states that a solution of this kind is already available; the question asked not to provide such a solution but to explain why the alternative solution is wrong.
â joriki
Aug 30 at 8:17
add a comment |Â
up vote
-1
down vote
OK this is an interesting problem. So we know that inserted credit equals $2$ or $3$. Let us try to calculate the probability that the inserted credit is $3$ given that we know it is $2$ or $3$. I will just call the inserted credit $x$. We use the formula $P(A|B)=P(A wedge B)/P(B)$. Where $A$ is $x=3$ and $B$ is $x=2 vee x=3$. This becomes $P(x=3 | (x=2 vee x=3))$. The fact that $A$ implies $B$ and so $P(A wedge B)=P(A)$ is important to keep in mind. We can calculate this as $0.5/0.7=0.71$. By a similar method, we can work out that the probability that the display read $2$ is $0.2/0.7=0.29$. These add up to $1$ which is good news. It must be one of them! Another way to have come at this would have been to say the answer must be $2$ or $3$ so the probabilities of these scores must split in the ration $0.2:0.5$ or $2:5$ or $0.29:0.71$.
The OP states that a solution of this kind is already available; the question asked not to provide such a solution but to explain why the alternative solution is wrong.
â joriki
Aug 30 at 8:17
add a comment |Â
up vote
-1
down vote
up vote
-1
down vote
OK this is an interesting problem. So we know that inserted credit equals $2$ or $3$. Let us try to calculate the probability that the inserted credit is $3$ given that we know it is $2$ or $3$. I will just call the inserted credit $x$. We use the formula $P(A|B)=P(A wedge B)/P(B)$. Where $A$ is $x=3$ and $B$ is $x=2 vee x=3$. This becomes $P(x=3 | (x=2 vee x=3))$. The fact that $A$ implies $B$ and so $P(A wedge B)=P(A)$ is important to keep in mind. We can calculate this as $0.5/0.7=0.71$. By a similar method, we can work out that the probability that the display read $2$ is $0.2/0.7=0.29$. These add up to $1$ which is good news. It must be one of them! Another way to have come at this would have been to say the answer must be $2$ or $3$ so the probabilities of these scores must split in the ration $0.2:0.5$ or $2:5$ or $0.29:0.71$.
OK this is an interesting problem. So we know that inserted credit equals $2$ or $3$. Let us try to calculate the probability that the inserted credit is $3$ given that we know it is $2$ or $3$. I will just call the inserted credit $x$. We use the formula $P(A|B)=P(A wedge B)/P(B)$. Where $A$ is $x=3$ and $B$ is $x=2 vee x=3$. This becomes $P(x=3 | (x=2 vee x=3))$. The fact that $A$ implies $B$ and so $P(A wedge B)=P(A)$ is important to keep in mind. We can calculate this as $0.5/0.7=0.71$. By a similar method, we can work out that the probability that the display read $2$ is $0.2/0.7=0.29$. These add up to $1$ which is good news. It must be one of them! Another way to have come at this would have been to say the answer must be $2$ or $3$ so the probabilities of these scores must split in the ration $0.2:0.5$ or $2:5$ or $0.29:0.71$.
edited Aug 30 at 8:20
answered Aug 30 at 7:20
Simon Terrington
41526
41526
The OP states that a solution of this kind is already available; the question asked not to provide such a solution but to explain why the alternative solution is wrong.
â joriki
Aug 30 at 8:17
add a comment |Â
The OP states that a solution of this kind is already available; the question asked not to provide such a solution but to explain why the alternative solution is wrong.
â joriki
Aug 30 at 8:17
The OP states that a solution of this kind is already available; the question asked not to provide such a solution but to explain why the alternative solution is wrong.
â joriki
Aug 30 at 8:17
The OP states that a solution of this kind is already available; the question asked not to provide such a solution but to explain why the alternative solution is wrong.
â joriki
Aug 30 at 8:17
add a comment |Â
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Since you haven't really given any reason, it's hard to say where it's wrong. You'd need to explain how you arrived at the erroneous belief that "we can infer from the display that the inserted credit is either $2$ or $3$" is equivalent to "there is a $50%$ probability that the credit is $2$ and a $50%$ probability that the credit is $3$". My guess would be that you probably did so by an erroneous application of the principle of indifference, but so far, that's just a guess.
â joriki
Aug 30 at 6:56
Well my reasoning is the following: the display itself has an own probability distribution. At time k=3 we are sure about it state, because we can read it on the screen. Because it's broken we can't really tell if what it's written it's true, but because we can infer that the inserted credit is either 2 or 3 we can say that given the state of the display the will be 2 or 3 coin with equal probability, because we don't have any further information
â Tommaso Bendinelli
Aug 30 at 7:03